

Abstract

If Stalin did not expect a German invasion, then what was the need for thousands of military echelons to go to the border, and on the basis of the border districts the front departments were deployed, and already on June 19 - two days before the attack, which Stalin did not expect - the front departments on orders from Moscow started advancing to field command posts? Twenty years ago Viktor Suvorov gave a

detailed answer to this question. He suggested - and substantiated it with open Soviet publications at his disposal - that Stalin was preparing for war...

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Mark Solonin

Three plans of Comrade Stalin

There is a fact. At dawn on June 22, 1941, Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union came as a terrible surprise to Comrade Stalin. Stalin did not believe in the possibility of such a development of events. Even on the evening of June 21, when ciphers flew from the command of the border districts to Moscow that the Germans were removing barbed wire on the border and the rumble of tank engines was hanging in the air, when at least three Wehrmacht soldiers crossed the border Bug in an attempt to warn the Motherland of the working people of the whole world - even then, Comrade Stalin doubted the authenticity of these reports. And on the morning of June 22, it took Stalin several hours to finally take reality into account.

Soviet radio broadcast cheerful Sunday music and read reports from the fields at a time when radio stations around the world broadcast the statements of Hitler and Ribbentrop. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of fascist Italy until noon unsuccessfully tried to find the Soviet ambassador in order to hand him an official note declaring war - on Sunday, June 22, the Soviet diplomat deigned to relax on the beach. Chargé d'affaires of the United Kingdom (British Ambassador S. Cripps had already been de facto escorted out of Moscow by that time) Bagdikian could not get a meeting with Molotov until 12 noon on June 22, and Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky arrogantly refused any discussion of issues of providing assistance to the Soviet Union from the UK, citing the lack of guidance.

The German attack amazed the inhabitants of the Kremlin offices, stunned them and plunged them into a state of shock. This is a fact.

There is one more fact, more precisely, a large group of facts. In May-June 1941, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union were in a state of covert strategic deployment. Moreover, all components of strategic deployment (mobilization of reservists, strategic regrouping and concentration of troops, operational deployment of groupings) were carried out in the mode

the strictest, unprecedented even by the super-tough Stalinist standards, secrecy.

The troops of the western districts advanced to the border by night crossings, and hid in the forests during the day; formations of the internal districts were transferred to the West in wagons boarded up with plywood shields, and even the commanders of the formations did not know the place of unloading (and even more so - the purpose of the regrouping and the combat mission). The call for reservists was made by personal agendas under the guise of "training camps". Until the very last hour, the government of the USSR did not present Germany with any claims related to the concentration of German troops near the border. Moreover, the official mouthpiece of the Soviet leadership - the TASS agency - on June 14 circulated a placating statement: "No war is foreseen between the USSR and Germany, the parties strictly observe the terms of the Non-Aggression Pact: rumors of an impending war "are clumsily concocted propaganda of forces

hostile to the USSR and Germany " In June 1941, the Soviet Union was preparing for large-scale military operations, but at the same time, by all possible means, it tried to disrupt the ongoing preparations. This is a fact.

Historians faced the task of combining these two facts into one picture, giving them an internally consistent interpretation. It's *easier* speaking, it was necessary to clarify one single question: if Stalin did not expect a German invasion, then for what reason were thousands of military echelons marching to the border, and on the basis of the border districts were deployed front departments, and already on June 19 - two days before the attack, which Stalin did not wait - front-line departments, on orders from Moscow, began advancing to field command posts?

Twenty years ago Viktor Suvorov gave a detailed answer to this question. He suggested - and justified it with open Soviet publications at his disposal - that Stalin was preparing for war. Always prepared, from the very first day of his power. Collectivization, industrialization, the Great Terror - all these are just different facets of Comrade Stalin's multifaceted work to turn the Land of Soviets into a huge military camp and

division of the builders of communism into two categories: "manpower" and "cannon

fodder". In August 1939, Stalin made the final decision to support Hitler. Support him like a rope supports a hanged man. Stalin helped Hitler start a war against a coalition of Western powers (England, France and their allies) in order for the outbreak of a war of extermination to devastate Europe, through the ashes of which Stalin's armies had to march in triumph. In June 1941, preparations for this march were interrupted by an unexpected invasion by the Wehrmacht, blinded by Stalin's megalomania.

Subsequently, V. Suvorov's hypothesis demonstrated the main sign of a true scientific theory, namely: all new facts and documents fit into the framework of Suvorov's concept, like cartridges in a clip. Accurately and clearly, without destroying the structure, but only increasing its "lethal power". P. Bobylev, T. Bushueva, V. Danilov, V. Kiselev, M. Meltyukhov, V. Nevezhin, I. Pavlova, M. Solonin, Yu. Felshtinsky - this is not a complete list of Russian historians, whose works contain hundreds of documents and facts that confirm the hypothesis of V. Suvorov and actually transfer it from the category of "hypothesis" to the rank of scientifically established truth (contrary to the now fashionable political correctness, I believe that the truth does exist, and the task of historical science is precisely in the search for truth, and not just "writing texts").

On the other hand, in the twenty years that have elapsed since the publication of "Icebreaker" no alternative concepts have been formulated. There is not a single book, there is not a single article. No one has ever tried to give another explanation, another interpretation of the two fundamental facts I mentioned above. But there is a huge stream of criticism of Suvorov, growing

every day. The information field is filled and overflowing with wild noise, uproar, screeching, mocking laughter. Huge areas of Karelian forests have been exhausted for the publication of libelous little books, in which, with ritual cries, the "presenting" that has already become a standard set is repeated. Suvorov's personality is dismantled bit by bit, and "as proven twice" that he is a very, very bad person. He is not our man. Radish. Claims are repeated ad infinitum about errors in the production indices of Kharkiv

locomotive building (that is, a tank) plant or incorrectly specified diameter of the left rear support roller.

According to D. Khmelnitsky's profoundly correct remark, *it is even pointless to reproach the producers of "anti-Suvorov" waste paper for dishonesty - the authors exclusively conscientiously perform a task that excludes a conscientious scientific approach. Neither in form nor in essence it can be classified as scientific historical literature. **These are works that consolidate the ideological** community* (emphasized by me - M.S.). Out of complete hopelessness, other critics confine themselves to endless repetition of the mantra: "Suvorov is lying in every word." On the "initiates", i.e. on members of the "militant anti-rezunists" sect, these cries produce a magical effect similar to a ritual

shaman.

"I don't need criticism, I need a version." This phrase, which was recorded on one of the countless Internet forums by an anonymous visitor, very clearly describes the historiographic situation that had developed by 2008. Version, alternative to the hypothesis / theory of V. Suvorov, as it was not, and is not. Particularly noteworthy is the deathly silence of the masters of Russian "historical science". I hasten to clarify right away - by "silence" I mean the absence of a VERSION, the absence of a logical, coherent, fact-based interpretation of Stalin's actions in 1939-1941. There is a lot of noise, shouting and calls to "stop rewriting history". Other speeches by Russian academicians make the best domestic comedians burn with envy. Here, for example, Comrade O. Rzheshhevsky speaks on the pages of the Krasnaya

Zvezda newspaper (and this, if anyone has forgotten, is the official print organ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), says the following words:

"Rejected as untenable by the majority of Russian and Western historians, this version (the version of V. Suvorov - M.S.) nevertheless germinated on domestic soil, primarily for the reason that the mass media actually do not give the opportunity to oppose it with the available reliable documents and facts".[1] That's it - they do not allow the Head of the Department of the

History of Wars and Geopolitics of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences,

President of the Association of Historians of the Second World War, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor Rzheshhevsky to editorial offices and publishing houses. A venerable scientist cannot present to the public "the reliable documents and facts that he has." I, an "amateur historian from Samara," can show it, but they shut up the President and the professor. Terrible thing. Not otherwise than here, too, the

"Englishwoman is shitting" ... And not only Comrade Rzheshhevsky is bound hand and foot. In Moscow alone, there are 257 Doctors and 436 Candidates of Sciences in the capital branch of the Academy of Military Sciences. And this is only in Moscow. According to the statute, a doctoral dissertation must be "a fundamental research that forms a new direction in science." 257 scientific discoveries in the field of military history! Outstanding scientists are moving towards the knowledge of the truth in fat herds. But in addition to doctors of military sciences, in Russian fields abundantly irrigated with petrodollars, incomparably more numerous flocks of doctors of historical sciences graze. And now sociological and political science

doctors have also appeared ... The deafening silence of official military history is not just a "sign of agreement" with Suvorov's hypothesis. This is a white sheet of surrender hanging from the windowsill of the generals' dachas. Having at their disposal all the archives of Russia, having a crowd of full-time subordinates paid at the expense of the taxpayer, for 20 years they have not been able to present to the "city and the world" a single document confirming Stalin's peaceful a

If the scientific discussion about the general direction of Stalin's military-political plans can be considered completed by now, then **the question of the planned dates for the start of the invasion of Europe still remains open.** And this is not surprising - the official Soviet / Russian "historical science" made every effort to conceal and distort information on this issue. Let's not forget that the identification of specific plans and deadlines is, in principle, impossible without access to that array of documents of the top military-political leadership of the USSR, which to this day are tightly closed to any independent researcher.

As will be shown below, these plans changed THREE TIMES, and the bizarre interweaving of fragments of information about Stalin's three very different plans poses an extremely difficult task for historians. The only thing that can be said today with all certainty is that within the framework of the existing source base, this problem will not be SOLVED. If anything is possible, it is only to formulate a series of HYPOTHESES that will be confirmed or refuted by the next generation of historians. For those who consider the discussion of unprovable hypotheses a waste of time, it makes no sense to continue reading this article. I ask everyone else to come to terms with the presence in this text of parasitic words that upset me myself: "possibly", "most likely", "probably", "it is possible", "it can be assumed" ...

Stalin's first, original plan was extremely simple and logical. The texts now known, in particular, the so-called "Stalin's report of August 19, 1939" published by the French agency "Gavas" on November 28, 1939; T. Bushuyeva's published record of this "report", found by her in the Special Archive (repository of trophy documents)[2]; The report of a group of Czechoslovak communists published by M. Schauli on the instructions they received in October 1939 in Moscow from the leadership of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the - , more likely, USSR[3] quite adequately conveys Stalin's intentions of the autumn 1939 model - although the problem of the authenticity of the texts themselves still needs to be resolved.

Plan No. 1 is an attempt to realize an ancient Chinese parable about a wise monkey watching a fight between two tigers from a mountain. *"As a result of his stupidity, Hitler gave us the opportunity to build bases against himself ... From the point of view of the economy, Hitler depends only on us, and we will direct his economy in such a way as to lead the warring countries to revolution. A long war will lead to revolution in Germany and in France ... The war will weaken Europe, which will become our easy prey. The peoples will accept any regime that comes after the war ... "* If we replace the ritual word "revolution" in a conversation between "comrade communists" with the words "devastation, chaos and anarchy", then Stalin's simple plan, like everything ingenious, will appear before us in all its glory.

In the autumn of 1939, there was no question of setting specific dates for the invasion of Europe: the war had just flared up, and the opposing sides were still very far from complete ruin and exhaustion. At this stage, it was Germany that seemed to Stalin to be the weak side of the conflict, to which he provided various political, psychological, and economic assistance so that the war would not stop at its very beginning due to the defeat of Germany. In this regard, one noteworthy point should be noted. In the above-mentioned report of the Czechoslovak communists, A.M. Aleksandrov (Head of the Central European Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) that *"we cannot afford Germany to lose."* This phrase has a long and quite reliable history.

It was said by Stalin himself in the late evening of August 23, 1939, during a conversation with Ribbentrop. On October 18, 1939, Ribbentrop decided to use this phrase in his public speech and, as a loyal partner of Stalin, sent the text to Moscow in advance for approval. In Ribbentrop's version, Stalin's words sounded like this: *"The Soviet Union is interested in Germany, which is its neighbor, being strong, and in the event of a test of strength between Germany and the Western democracies, the interests of the USSR and Germany will, of course, coincide. The Soviet Union will never wants to see Germany in a difficult situation."*[4] Comrade Stalin was sympathetic to Ribbentrop's desire to publicly intimidate the hated Anglo-French plutocrats and only asked for a slight softening of the wording. In the agreed version, Stalin's words sounded like this: *"The Soviet Union is interested in the existence of a strong Germany. The Soviet Union, therefore, cannot approve of the actions of the Western powers, creating conditions for the weakening of Germany and putting her in a difficult position."*[5] This correspondence was published 60 years ago by the US State Department in the famous collection of captured documents of the German Foreign Ministry "Nazi - Soviet Relations", and historians have no doubts about its authenticity.

The deed (i.e., the anti-Western orientation of Stalin's policy) was not limited to words alone. The Red Army invaded Poland and occupied just over half of its territory - an action that formally brought the USSR to the brink of war with Great Britain,

gave Poland the notorious "guarantees" of the inviolability of its territory. Then there was an attack on Finland, a traditional ally of the Western democracies, the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the League of Nations, and the not formally legal, but quite real prospect of the Soviet Union entering the European war as an opponent of the Anglo-French bloc.

An amazing document (surprising not for its content, but for the fact that it was not destroyed in time) was preserved in the bowels of the Russian State Military Archive. On March 5, 1940, the Deputy Head of the Special Department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, Major of State Security Osetrov, wrote a memorandum to People's Commissar of

Defense Voroshilov: *"On January 31, Commander of the Siberian Military District Army Commander 2nd Rank Kalinin made a report on the international situation in the district house of the Red Army ... Kalinin announced the inevitability of a big war in the spring of 1940, in which, on the one hand, the USSR would stand in a bloc with Germany, Japan and Italy against the Anglo-French bloc ... Military operations with England, France and their allies would be protracted ..."* [6] In the last

lines of the memorandum, the deputy chief "special officer" of the NKVD of the USSR draws extremely strange *conclusions: "Many commanders consider Comrade Kalinin's speech confused and the coverage of the international situation in this form politically harmful."* How would you like to understand such vagueness and caution in the assessment? Since when did the "specialists" hide behind the "opinion of many commanders"? And this after the NKVD successfully jailed and shot many thousands of Red Army commanders? It can be assumed that on March 5,

1940 Comrade. Osetrov himself still did not really know how it was now necessary to "cover the international situation", with whom and against whom the Soviet Union would fight, but just in case he decided to inform Voroshilov in order to relieve himself of any responsibility. Judging by the consequences - June 4, 1940 S.A. Kalinin receives the rank of lieutenant general and continues to safely command his district - a report with open statements about the "inevitability of war against the British

French bloc", and even in alliance with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, was not at all evaluated as a vicious slander on the invariably peaceful foreign policy of the USSR. The war against England

and its allies was not just talked about in the "district house of the Red Army". To her a number of aviation historians (V. Belokon, A. Stepanov) drew attention to the obvious "anti-English" direction of the development of the Soviet Air Force at the turn of the 30-40s. Already having the DB-3f bomber in serial production and in service with combat units, capable of flying 3300 km with a bomb load of 1 ton (the German He-111, the farthest at that time, had a combat range of no more than 2700 km), in January 1939 Stalin set the designers the task of creating a bomber with a range of 5000 km. requirements, the twin-engine bomber Yer-2 was developed and put into mass production at the largest Voronezh aircraft plant No. 18. Where, how far were the "Stalin's falcons" flying on bombers with a huge range? From Minsk to Berlin - 1000 km, from Minsk to

Hamburg - 1200 km, from Kyiv to Munich - 1400 km, from Vladivostok to Tokyo - 1200 km. The range of the serial DB-3f was quite enough for the bombing of these targets. But to strike at the British Isles, indeed, a bomber with a much greater range was required (from Minsk to London 1900 km, to Manchester - 2000 km). The most fantastic project was the "product PB-4": a long-range, heavy, 4-engine and, for all that, a dive (!!!) bomber. Such an incredible (never realized by anyone in metal) combination of

parameters was determined by the task: the aircraft was intended to fight large surface ships, which it had to hit with a super-heavy bomb accelerated in a dive to a speed that allowed it to penetrate the battleship's armored deck. PB-4 was developed in a "sharashka" - the prison design bureau of the NKVD, in which Beria carefully collected the entire color of Soviet engineering thought: Bartini, Glushko, Yeger, Korolev, Myasishchev, Petlyakov, Stechkin, Tupolev, Charomsky ... According to Yeger, when developing the PB- 4, an English battleship was considered as a typical object for bombing

The Nelson and the Royal Navy base at Scapa Flow. And although the creation of an aircraft with such parameters exceeded the capabilities of aviation technology of that era, work on the PB-4 project continued until the end of 1939.

In a conversation about how "a powerful defense industry was created under the leadership of the Communist Party on the eve of the war," they will definitely remember and name the T-34 and KV tanks, rocket launchers ("Katyusha"), and the Il-2 attack aircraft. At the same time, it is customary to forget about the grandiose program for the construction of the navy. In the list of military equipment, equipment and weapons purchased in 1939-1940. in Germany (in exchange for fodder grain, cake and flax tow), almost half are numerous samples of naval (including special corrosion-resistant guns for submarines) and coastal artillery, mine and torpedo weapons, sonar instruments, carrier-based reconnaissance aircraft and catapults for launching them, propeller and turbine shafts, marine diesels, ship armor steel, and finally, the latest cruiser "Luttsov", then completed in Leningrad. Of the 25 billion rubles allocated in 1940 according to the plan for orders for weapons and military equipment, almost a quarter (5.8 billion) was allocated to the People's Commissariat of the Navy.[7] By the beginning of the World War, the Navy of the great maritime power of Great

Britain had 58 submarines, Germany - 57, Italy - 68, Japan - 63. The huge continental country of the USSR was in service (although not by September 39, but by June 41 .) 267 submarines. Two hundred sixty seven. The question is - which country's naval blockade was supposed to be carried out by this huge submarine fleet?

In the "Note of the Commander of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet on the plan of operations of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet" (not earlier than March 27, 1940) we read:

"Probable adversary: England, France, Romania, Turkey Air Force tasks: to strike at ships in the waters of the Sea of Marmara, the Bosphorus, laying minefields in the Bosphorus ..."
[\[8\]](#).

Report of the Commander of the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet to the Main Naval Staff on the plan for the development of aviation of the Black Sea Fleet for 1940-1941. assumed the following development of events:

"... Aviation tasks in theaters of operations: 1.

Black Sea. Delivering powerful bombing strikes on bases: Constanta, Izmail, Varna ...

2. Aegean Sea: Thessaloniki,

Smyrna ... 3. Mediterranean Sea: Alexandria, Haifa, Suez Canal, about. Malta, Brindisi... By systematic strikes on the Suez Canal, deprive England and the Mediterranean states of the possibility of normal operation of this communication..."[9] In - .

the same months of the spring of 1940, the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force prepared a 19-page document entitled: *"Description of routes through India No. 1 (Barochil, Chitral passes) and No. 4 (Killio, Gilchit, Srinagor passes)*

[10] A "List of military-industrial facilities" of Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and India was compiled on 34 pages.[11] All of the listed countries are colonies or allies of Great Britain. On May 11, 1940,

Divisional Commissar Shabalin submits a memorandum to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Mekhlis, in which he writes with great concern about "the need to carefully review the organization of units and formations of the Red Army from the point of view of *readiness them to wage war in the Middle East theater*"[12]

All this "Manilovism", sweet dreams about the "passes of Killio, Gilchit, Srinagor" on the way to the Indian Ocean and the liberation campaign against Jerusalem, crumbled to smithereens in May 1940. France and its allies were defeated within one month. The English Expeditionary Corps barely got away, leaving mountains of heavy weapons on the coastal sand of Dunkirk. The newborn Wehrmacht with dizzying speed turned into the most powerful army in the world. Much of continental Western Europe came under Hitler's control. This stunning reality forced Stalin to urgently change the strategic plan for the war. Quite recently

(April 17, 1940), less than a month before the start of the German offensive in the West, speaking at the Conference of the senior command staff of the Red Army, Stalin expressed his concern about the passivity of the sluggishly fighting imperialists: "They are fighting there, *but some kind of weak war, or*

fight or play cards. Suddenly they will take it and reconcile, which is not excluded. "Two months later, the German troops marched under the Arc de Triomphe in Paris, and the very wise monkey loomed up with the prospect of being alone with an angry, tasted blood tiger. But it passed.

In the summer of 1940, Hitler for the first (but not the last) time helped Stalin to get out of an extremely difficult situation. Instead of stopping in time and, in the cynical language of stock speculators, "fixing profits," Hitler decided to finish off recalcitrant England. And then the scythe found a stone. On June 22 (yes, history sometimes makes strange jokes ...) 1940, the Soviet ambassador I. Maisky reported from London to Moscow:

"Now it is already possible to say with complete certainty that the decision of the British government, despite the surrender of France, to continue the war, finds the universal support of the population ... Churchill's speeches played a big role in this. There is no panic. On the contrary, a wave of stubborn, cold British fury and determination to resist to end..."

In August 1940, a large-scale air attack on the British Isles began. However, despite the significant numerical superiority of the Luftwaffe, the blitzkrieg in the sky over London did not take place. It was not possible to strangle England with a noose by a naval blockade, although German submariners achieved tremendous success, sending 300,000 tons of destroyed ships to the bottom of the sea every month. The war, which in June 1940 seemed already over, flared up with renewed vigor, spreading over a vast territory from the coast of northern Norway to the deserts of North Africa. Comrade Stalin was able to breathe a sigh of relief and proceed to the development of "plan number 2". Plan No. 2 is a plan for war with Germany. Not with

Germany, but against Germany.

In contrast to "Plan No. 1", the content of which can only be guessed from individual crumbs of information, "Plan No. 2" is known today in sufficient detail. In the first half of the 1990s, the following documents were declassified and published in a number of collections:

- Memorandum of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to I.V. August 1940

[\[13\]](#)

- A document with the same name, but with a number (No. 103202) and the exact date of signing (September 18, 1940)[\[14\]](#)—

- Memorandum of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov No. 103313 (the document begins with the words *"I report for your approval the main conclusions from your instructions given on October 5, 1940 . when considering plans for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR for 1941, "* in connection with which it is usually referred to as the " updated October strategic deployment plan ") —

[\[15\]](#) -Memorandum of the chief of staff of the Kiev OVO by decision of the Military Council of the South-Western Front on the deployment plan for 1940, w / n, no later than December 1940 -Excerpts from the report of [\[16\]](#)

the General Staff of the Red Army "On the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the West and in the East", w / n, dated March 11, 1940[\[17\]](#)

- Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the commander of the Western OVO to develop a plan for the operational deployment of the district troops, w/n, [\[18\]](#) April 1941 —

- Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the [Armed](#) Forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies, b / n, not earlier than May 15, 1941. The documents [\[19\]](#)

describing the operational plans of the Soviet command should also include the materials of the January (1941) operational-strategic games held by the highest command staff of the Red Army. We are led to this conclusion not only by simple everyday logic, but also by an article published only in 1992 by Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky (as deputy chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, he participated in the development of all the above operational plans), which directly indicates that *"in January 1941, when the proximity of the war was already felt quite distinctly,*

the main points of the operational plan were tested in a strategic war game with the participation of the highest command personnel of the armed forces."[20]

Strictly speaking, there is plenty of information for reflection. Historians have at their disposal five variants of the general plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army and materials on the operational plans of the two most important fronts: the Southwestern and the Western. In this article, only a few

key points.

Firstly, there was an operational plan for the Great War (*"An operational plan for the war against Germany existed, and it was worked out not only in the General Staff, but also detailed by the commanders of the troops and headquarters of the western border military districts of the Soviet Union" - A.M. Vasilevsky*). It is strange that this should be emphasized, but other propagandists, in their "diligence beyond reason", even went so far as to assert that the "naive and gullible" Stalin replaced the development of military operational plans by lovingly looking at Ribbentrop's signature on the notorious "Non-Aggression Pact" . Of course, there was a plan for a war with Germany, and many

months of work on it went on without any regard to the Pact. In the plans for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR mentioned above (i.e., starting from August 1940), England is no longer mentioned as a possible adversary of the USSR (!!!); Germany is invariably considered the main adversary, which supposedly could be supported by Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland. A careful comparison of the documents makes it possible to speculate about the deliberate (in order to hide the true plans of the

country's top military-political leadership) disinformation of its own troops, which rose up to the level of commanders of military districts. Documents addressed to the command of the districts (or drawn up in the districts in accordance with the directives of the General Staff) and in content and text coincide with the general plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army and the general plan for the first offensive operations. But there is one **important difference**.

The first lines of the "district documents" (a note by the chief of staff of the Kiev OVO in December 1940 and the Directive for the development of a plan for the operational deployment of the Western OVO in April 1941) contain the following phrase: "Non-aggression pacts between the USSR and Germany, *between the USSR and Italy at present time, it can be assumed, ensure a peaceful situation on our western frontiers.*" In the documents of the top leadership (memorandums of the People's Commissar of Defense addressed to Stalin and Molotov), the notorious "Pact" is not mentioned even once! Further, in April 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR orients the commander of the troops of the Western Special Military District as follows:

"The USSR does not think of attacking Germany and Italy. These states, apparently, also do not think of attacking the USSR in the near future. However, given (the following is a list of various foreign policy events - M.S.), it is necessary to have in mind not only of such adversaries as Finland, Rumania, England, but also of such possible adversaries as Germany, Italy and Japan. And this despite the fact that in the "Kremlin documents" it is precisely and

only Germany that is unequivocally called the main enemy, and there is not a word about a possible war with England! Secondly, all strategic deployment plans published so far are

actually the same document, only slightly changing from one version to another. There is not only a semantic, but also a clear textual similarity of all planes. Without exception, all plans are **plans for an offensive operation carried out outside the state borders of the USSR**. A strategic defensive operation on one's own territory was not even considered as **one of the possible scenarios** for the development of events in a future war! The entire toponymy of the theater of alleged military operations is the names of Polish and Prussian cities and rivers. The depth of the offensive as part of the solution of the "first strategic task" is 250-300 km, a long-term operation - 20-30 days. Thirdly, only the August (1940) version of the plan puts the choice of the direction of deployment of the main forces of the Red Army in

dependence on the probable plans of the enemy ("assuming *that the main attack of the Germans will be directed north of the mouth of the San River, it is also necessary to have the main forces of the Red Army deployed north of Polesie*"). With a big stretch, this logic can also be called "planning a counterstrike." Nevertheless, the subsequent options establish the direction of the main attack solely from considerations of military-operational and political "conveniences" for the advancing Red Army. The assessment of the probable plans of the German command (delivering the main attack by the Germans to the north or south of the swamps of Polesye) changes several times, but this does not affect the choice of the direction of

the main attack of the Red Army. More specifically: starting from September 1940, all variants of the operational plan provide for the deployment of the main forces of the Red Army in the area of the so-called "Lviv salient" to strike in the general direction on Krakow-Katowice. The choice of just such a deployment scheme is justified by the drafters of the documents by purely offensive considerations: the enemy's lack of long-term defensive fortifications in this direction; the nature of the terrain, which makes it possible to realize the striking power of tank formations to a greater extent; the possibility of cutting off Germany from the raw materials (oil) and food resources of southeastern Europe already at the first stage of the war. If the idea of the

operation is clear, and the discussion is possible only in terms of clarifying individual details, then even the approximate date for the start of the "liberation campaign" cannot be established on the basis of declassified documents. The

hypothesis expressed by V. Suvorov and I. Bunich that Stalin intended to start the invasion of Europe at the moment when the German troops landed on the British Isles does not find confirmation in known documents. There are no words, the hypothesis is beautiful and logical, but for a historian, the "beauty of the idea" alone is not enough. The phrase in the Memorandum of the Chief of Staff of the Kiev OVO (December 1940) cannot be considered a confirmation of this hypothesis: "*Germany's armed attack on the USSR is most likely in a situation where Germany will be victorious in the fight against England and retain its economic and military*

dominating influence in the Balkans". Neither Moscow nor Kiev were going to passively wait for "Germany's armed attack on the USSR"; the offensive plan was to be implemented even before "*Germany in the fight against England will be the winner*", but when exactly - there is not a word about this in the Memorandum of Understanding. Big questions are raised by the Report of the General Staff of the Red Army dated March 11, 1941, which - contrary to all the written and unwritten rules of the scientific publication of historical documents - was published in an extremely truncated form. In fact, only a detailed review of the alleged plans and groupings of the enemy. The own plans of the Soviet command were deliberately left behind the scenes. Interest

in this document was fueled by none other than M.A. Gareev himself, who had the imprudence to state that in the Report of March 11, 1941 (in that part of it, which was not published) Vatutin's hand was inscribed with the phrase: "*Offensive to begin 12.6*".[21] On the Internet forum of the site "Military Literature" a certain comrade claimed that he held this document in his hands, that in the archival form there are already 12 names of people, who worked with the document, and that the indicated handwritten inscription on the back of one of the sheets, indeed, is available. However, none of these enigmatic "twelve initiates" published the full text of the Report of March 11, 1941.

Of course, such a "historiographical situation" cannot evoke anything but bitter laughter through tears. The Russian state continues to successfully play hide-and-seek with independent historians. I remember that in the years of my childhood there was such a radio program: "Guessing game, guessing

game is an interesting game ..." Let's return, however, to the published documents. They give some reason to assume that the mysterious inscription "*offensive start on June 12*" (if only it exists in reality!) Could not be connected with June 12, 1941. Most likely, it was about the summer of 1942. And that's why. April 41st came after March 11, 1941. Accordingly, the April (1941) Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense to develop a plan for the operational deployment of the troops of the Western OVO had to take into account the decisions taken by Stalin on the Report of the military leadership of March 11. In accordance with this Directive, the troops of the Western OVO

they were supposed to deliver crushing blows *"in the general direction to Sedlec, Radom with the aim of complete encirclement, in cooperation with the Southwestern Front, of the Lublin grouping of the enemy ... Take possession of the Sedlec operation on the third day of the operation*

and on the 5th day - crossings to the Vistula River. " The main striking force of the district (front) was to be five mechanized corps: 6 MK, 11 MK, 13 MK, 14 MK and 17 MK. Of these, by June 1941, only 6 MKs were almost completely equipped with military equipment and vehicles; two other mechanized corps (11th and 14th), according to the plans of the General Staff, completed their formation only at the beginning of 1942. As for the 13 MK and 17 MK, they were at an early stage of formation, and even by the end of 1941 their planned manning with tanks did not exceed 25-30%. It was impossible for such a tank group to launch the offensive

planned by the Directive on June 12, 1941. In general, the entire program launched in February 1941 for the formation of gigantic armored forces consisting of thirty mechanized corps of a thousand tanks each, the re-equipment of this monstrous armored horde with "tanks of new types", i.e. KV and T-34, could not be completed until the end of 1942 (if not later). No reasonable person - and Stalin was no doubt a sober and extremely cautious person - would have started such a grandiose "major overhaul" in the months before the Great War. It may very well be that in the endless incantations of Soviet historical propaganda ("Stalin hoped to delay the German attack until the summer of 1942"), there is a fair amount of truth. True, the truth is bizarrely distorted. Stalin did not create the largest army in the world in order to guess with bated breath: "he will attack - he will not attack ..." Stalin led his own, active and offensive policy; he did not wait for Hitler's attack at all, but chose the optimal moment for delivering a crushing first blow. In March 1941, this moment was most likely attributed not to the summer of 1941, but to the beginning of the summer ("June 12") of 1942 or even 1943.

"There are two wills in the field," says an old Russian proverb. The dramatic development of the events of the world war did not allow Stalin to prepare for the invasion of Europe thoroughly, "with feeling, with sense, with the arrangement." At some point in the spring of 1941, Stalin

I realized that it would not be possible to "delay" until the summer of next year, and it was possible to strike first only if the Red Army launched an offensive no later than September 1941. Thus, "Plan No. 2" died before it could be realized, and the top military-political leadership of the Soviet Union had to develop "Plan No. 3".

When did this sharp turn in Stalin's plans take place? Oddly enough, but we can determine this point in time with an accuracy of one or two months (which, in the absence of direct documentary evidence, can be considered high accuracy). **Not earlier than April 6 - and not later than May 24, 1941.**

April 6, 1941 is one of the most mysterious days in the history of the Second World War. Recall the main outline of events. On the night of March 26-27, a military coup took place in Belgrade, inspired by either the British or Soviet intelligence services. The new government of General Simovich announced its intention to give a firm rebuff to German claims and turned to the Soviet Union for help.

On April 3 (that is, only a week after the coup), the Yugoslav delegation was already negotiating in Moscow on the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Stalin himself. Despite the fact that Germany, through Ambassador Schulenburg, brought to the attention of Molotov its opinion that *"the moment for concluding an agreement with Yugoslavia was chosen unsuccessfully and causes an undesirable impression"*, at 2-30 am on April 6, 1941, the Soviet-Yugoslav agreement

was signed. A few hours after its signing, Luftwaffe aircraft subjected Belgrade to a fierce bombardment, and German troops invaded Yugoslav territory. The Soviet Union did nothing to help its new friend. On April 6, at about 4 p.m. Moscow time, Molotov received Schulenburg and, after listening to the official announcement of the Wehrmacht's invasion of Yugoslavia, limited himself to a melancholy remark: "It is extremely sad that, despite all efforts, *the expansion of the war thus turned out to be inevitable ...*" [22] What was that? Why was Stalin demonstratively "teasing" Hitler, having no desire (and no practical possibility) to provide Yugoslavia with effective military assistance? It is well known that

in Berlin, this strange diplomatic demarche was received with extreme irritation. Later (June 22, 1941), it was the events of April 5-6 that were used in the German memorandum declaring war on the Soviet Union as the main evidence of the hostile policy that the Soviet Union pursued against Germany ("With the conclusion of the Soviet-Yugoslav friendship treaty, which strengthened the *rear Belgrade conspirators, the USSR joined the common Anglo-Yugoslav-Greek front directed against Germany*"). April 6 is the last day about which it can be said with certainty that on this day Soviet-German relations

were very tense and unfriendly. Further, **the external** (let us also emphasize this word with three bold lines) outline of events changes dramatically. Moreover, it is changing in a purely unilateral manner - Moscow begins defiantly and obsessively to be friends with Berlin.

On April 13, 1941, a major event of global significance took place: the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan was signed in Moscow - an agreement that freed Stalin's hands for action in the West. On the same day, there was a small episode at the Moscow railway station, which, however, attracted the close attention of politicians and diplomats from all over the world. In the report, which the German ambassador on the same day marked "Urgent! Secret!" sent to Berlin, this strange episode was described as follows:

"... Obviously unexpectedly for both the Japanese and the Russians, Stalin and Molotov suddenly appeared and, in an emphatically friendly manner, greeted Matsuoka and the Japanese who were present there and wished them a pleasant journey. Then Stalin loudly asked about me and, having found me, approached, hugged me by the shoulders and said: "We must remain friends, and you must now do everything for this!" Then Stalin turned to

the acting German military attaché, Colonel Krebs, and, after making sure that he was German, told him: "We will remain friends with you in any case." Stalin, no doubt, greeted Colonel Krebs and me in this way deliberately and thereby consciously attracted the large audience that was present there."

attention

Warm hugs at the door of the car were soon supplemented by other equally demonstrative actions. Embassies and diplomatic missions of countries defeated and occupied by the Wehrmacht were closed in Moscow. The embassy of the same Yugoslavia, on the treaty of friendship with which, as they say, "the ink has not yet dried" was no exception. On the other hand, relations with Great Britain reached such a freezing point that on June 6, 1941, British Ambassador S. Cripps was recalled from Moscow to London "for consultations." In May 1941, the Soviet Union with lightning speed recognized the pro-German government of Iraq, which came to power through a military coup. All issues of economic cooperation were resolved in the most benevolent spirit towards Germany. In the memorandum of the German Foreign Ministry dated May 15, 1941 No.

noted:

"Negotiations with the First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR were held in a very constructive spirit ... I have the impression that we could present Moscow with economic demands, even beyond the scope of the agreement of January 10, 1941 ... At this time, the volume of raw materials stipulated by the agreement, is delivered by the Russians punctually, despite the fact that it costs them great effort; contracts, especially in relation to grain, are carried out remarkably ... "[23]

The elderly Count Schulenburg was completely fascinated by the embraces of the hospitable Moscow hosts (by the way, in 1944 the former German ambassador to the USSR was executed for participating in a conspiracy against Hitler, so his "naive gullibility" could not be as naive as it seems) . On May 24, 1941, in another report to Berlin, he writes: "... The

*fact that this foreign policy is primarily aimed at preventing a clash with Germany is proved by the position taken by the Soviet government **in recent weeks** (emphasized by me - M.S.) , the tone of the Soviet press, which considers all events concerning Germany in an unobjectionable form, and the observance of economic agreements ... "[24]*

On May 5, 1941, Stalin appointed himself Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, i.e. head of the government of the USSR. This event surprised everyone then - except,

of course, the citizens of the Land of Soviets, who warmly and unanimously approved another wise decision. Everyone else was lost in conjecture. Later, in the autumn of 1941, S. Cripps wrote in his report addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Eden: "...

things began to happen in the USSR that obviously had some special goals. Shortly after the May Day parade, a decree was published appointing Stalin to the post of prime minister Minister, which was undoubtedly an act of enormous political significance. Everyone claimed that behind this step of his there was some important goal, but no one knew for sure what this meant ..."[25]

This mystery is great. It is hardly necessary to explain that even before May 5, 1941, Comrade Stalin, being just one of the many deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, had absolute power. And until May 5, 1941, Comrade Molotov, being the nominal Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, coordinated any step, any decision of the government with the will of Stalin. For many years, Stalin ruled the country, not feeling the need to formalize his actual status as the sole dictator. What changed at the beginning of May 1941?

On May 10, 1941, the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved the "List of issues to be considered at the meeting" (whom with whom is not indicated). Item 14 of the agenda reads as follows: *"On additional cost estimates **for the period of mobilization and the first month** of the war."*[26] On May 12, 1941, the "List of Questions in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" was

prepared. Item 7: *"On the work of the Civil Air Fleet (Civil Air Fleet) **in wartime**."*[27] The following document deserves special attention. On June 4, 1941, People's Commissar of the Navy N. Kuznetsov sent a memorandum No. 1146 to the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (i.e., Stalin's deputy) N. Voznesensky. The document was classified as "top secret, of special importance." And this is indeed a document of particular importance for a historian - for the first time, absolutely specific dates appear next to the phrase "wartime" in it: *"At the same time, I present a statement of the needs of the People's Commissariat of the Navy for mine and torpedo weapons **for wartime from 07/01/41 to 01/01/43**. Please Your instructions to increase the allocated quantities*

the need for them for the 2nd half of 1941 in / year is 50% of the total need for the period up to 1.01.43 . "[28]

As you can see, the People's Commissar of the Navy plans to fight as early as next month. The operational plan for this great naval war has already been drawn up - otherwise N.G. Kuznetsov could not predict the specific distribution of the consumption of mine and torpedo weapons for each half of the year.

In May (not earlier than May 15, the exact date is not known), another version of the "Considerations on the Plan for the Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union" was drawn up. boundaries - contain some new moment. Namely: *"Germany has the ability to warn us in the deployment and deliver a surprise strike."* In all other known variants of the strategic deployment plan, **there is no such phrase in content.** Further, the developers of the plan insistently suggest *"in no case give the German Command the initiative to act, preempt the enemy and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the military branches."* It is extremely important to emphasize that this is not at all about the "greater aggressiveness" of the May "Considerations" - all the previous options also did not offer anything other than a large-scale offensive operation outside the state borders of the USSR. As for the intention to get ahead of the enemy and "under no circumstances give him the initiative to act," this is just an elementary requirement of common sense. The essential novelty

lies in the fact that in May of the 41st, the Soviet command **was no longer so sure that he would be able to do this**, and therefore asked Stalin to immediately take all the necessary measures, *"without which it is impossible to deliver a surprise attack on the enemy both from the air, so on earth."*

On May 24, 1941, many hours of meeting, the participants of which, in addition to Stalin himself, were:

- Deputy Prime Minister and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov

- People's Commissar of Defense

- Timoshenko - Chief of the General Staff

- Zhukov - Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff

- Vatutin - Chief of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force Zhigarev

- commanders of the troops of five western border districts,

members of the Military Councils and commanders of the Air Forces of these districts.

There were no other equally representative meetings of the top military-political leadership of the USSR either a few months before May 24, or after this date until the start of the war. No less remarkable is the list

of those who

was not at the Meeting on May 24, 1941. Not invited:

- Chairman of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars

- of the USSR Marshal Voroshilov - Deputy People's Commissars of Defense: Marshals Budyonny, Kulik, Shaposhnikov,

- General of the Army Meretskov - Head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the

- Red Army Zaporozhets -

- People's Commissar of the Navy N.

- Kuznetsov - People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beria - Secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b) Zhdanov and

Malenkov, who oversaw military issues along the party line and were members of the Main Military Council. Here, in fact, is the whole "array of information". Nothing more is known to this day. Neither Soviet nor Russian official historiography uttered a word about the subject of discussion and the decisions taken on May 24. Nothing was reported in their memoirs by the few participants in the Conference who survived to see Stalin's death. Declassified already at the beginning of the 21st century, the Special Folders of the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for May 1941 (RGASPI, f.17, op. 162, d.34-35) also do not contain even the slightest mention of this Meeting. And only Marshal Vasilevsky, in his article, which has lain in archival silence for almost 27 years, recalls: *"A few weeks before the attack on us by fascist Germany, unfortunately I cannot name the exact date, all the documentation on the district operational plans was handed over by the General Staff to the command and the headquarters of the resp*

What conclusions can we draw from the scraps of information we have? On May 24, 1941, a meeting of the top military-political leadership of the country was held. The composition of the participants in the Meeting is rather strange: there are no marshals who occupy high and loud positions by name, but there are lieutenant generals from the districts. If the usual "duty event" took place in Stalin's office, something like a discussion of the results of combat training of troops and plans for exercises for the summer period, then the composition of the participants would most likely be different. It remains to be assumed that Vasilevsky's memory did not fail him, and it was during the Meeting on May 24, 1941 that the contents of the top-secret operational plans were brought to the attention of the executors, i.e. commands of border military districts (future fronts).

If this is so, then the selection of participants in the Meeting (only those who developed the latest version of the operational plan of the war, and who were to carry out this plan) and the strictest, impenetrable veil of secrecy that surrounded (and still surrounds) everything becomes completely understandable. which is connected with the secrecy of the May 24 Conference. If our assumption is correct, and at the Meeting on May 24, 1941, the war plan against Germany approved by Stalin was brought to the attention of future front commanders, then the "range of possible dates" for the start of the operation narrows to almost two months: from mid-July to the end of August 1941.

Let us briefly explain this rather obvious conclusion. If in May 41 the invasion of Europe was planned to begin in 1942 (and even more so in 1943), then on May 24, 1941, top-secret operational plans would not have been transferred to the command of the military districts. Too early. Dangerous - the possibility of information leakage increases dramatically. Yes, and it makes no sense - until the summer of 1942, the military-political situation could change many times over. And the very fact of holding the Conference on May 24, and the policy of ostentatious "peacefulness" in relations with Germany that has clearly emerged since mid-April, and Stalin's official acceptance of the post of head of the USSR government, and - most importantly - the covert mobilization and large-scale redeployment of troops that began in late May, allow suggest that Stalin's Plan No. 3 was supposed to start the invasion of Europe in the summer of 1941.

It is not possible to indicate the exact specific date for the start of the strategic concentration of the Red Army troops. A beautiful metaphor proposed by V. Suvorov ("a lion in the savanna at first creeps up to its victim for a long time and silently and only at the last moment, with a deafening growl, rushes at it in an open jump") describes the situation in May-June 1941 in the best possible way. The deployment of the Red Army took place in an atmosphere of unprecedented secrecy, in violation of many "generally accepted" rules. *"The total volume of transportation of military formations was 939 railway echelons. The prolongation of the advance of troops and the late periods of concentration were determined by camouflage measures and the preservation of the peacetime railway regime," write the authors of the collective work "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions"* (compiled by a large group of military historians USSR in 1992)

The phrase about the "extended movement of troops", and even with **the "preservation of the regime of operation of the railways in peacetime"** deserves special attention. For the multi-million armies of the first half of the 20th century, railways, trains and locomotives became the most important "arms of the army", which largely determined the outcome of the main battles of the two world wars. Accordingly, all countries had plans developed back in peacetime for the transfer of railway traffic to the "maximum military traffic" regime. Thus, at the stage of the strategic deployment of the Wehrmacht for the invasion of the USSR, the railways switched to the schedule of maximum military transportation from May 23. The regime of military transportation in the European part of the USSR was introduced (September 12, 1939) even at the stage of the strategic deployment of the Red Army before the war with Poland, which was dilapidated — by the invasion of the Wehrmacht.[29] However, in June 1941, nothing of the kind

According to the calculations contained in the pre-war plans of the Soviet command, it took from 8 days (for the Northern Front, i.e. Leningrad Military District) to 30 days (for the South-Western Front, i.e. Kiev OVO). In fact, in the conditions of maintaining the mode of operation of the railways in peacetime, the regrouping of troops was not forced, but in fact

dragged on. It was dragged on with a completely understandable goal frankly named in 1992 by a group of Soviet historians - to ensure the maximum possible "camouflage measures." To put it even more simply - do not scare the "game" ahead of time.

The formations of the 16th Army and the 5th mechanized corps located in Transbaikalia and Mongolia were the first to start moving. On May 22, 1941, the loading of the first units into echelons began, which, taking into account the vast distance and the continuing schedule of the peacetime railways, were supposed to arrive in Ukraine, in the Berdichev - Proskurov - Shepetovka region in the period from June 17 to July 10. From May 13 to May 22, orders were received from the General Staff to begin advancing two more armies of the High Command reserve to the western border. The 22nd Army was advancing to the Velikie Luki - Vitebsk region with a concentration deadline of **July 1-3**, the 21st Army was concentrating in the Chernigov - Gomel - Konotop region **by July 2**. On May 29, a decision was made to form the 19th Army and deploy it in area of Cherkasy - Bila Tserkva **by July 7**. Not earlier than June 13, a decision was made to form another one, the 20th Army, on the basis of the formations of the Orlovsky and Moscow Military Districts, which was

supposed to concentrate at Smolensk **by July 3-5**. ***"The transfer of troops was planned with the expectation of completing the concentration in the areas outlined by operational plans from June 1 to July 10, 1941."*** ***Already for this phrase, the authors of the***

collective monograph "1941 - Lessons and Conclusions" should have been awarded the medal "For Courage". In fact, this phrase means that when developing "operational plans", in particular - when drawing up a deployment schedule, the German invasion was not expected. The chronology is very simple. Troops that have completed their concentration by July 10 will complete their operational deployment and prepare for battle no earlier than July 15-20. In order to conduct a strategic

DEFENSIVE operation, this is already **hopelessly late** (which was mercilessly confirmed

It would be naive to expect that Hitler - if he decides to attack the USSR in 1941 - will delay the start of the invasion until the second half of July. As is now known, according to the original plan of the German command, the invasion was to begin on May 15, after the final drying of the dirt roads of the European part

USSR from the spring thaw. The Balkan campaign "mixed the cards" of Hitler and led to a delay of the attack on the USSR for as much as five weeks (it is no secret that, according to many military experts - and not only from among the "beaten Hitler generals" - this delay was fatally reflected in the results of the campaign). To start an offensive in the second half of July would be complete madness - even in the absence of any resistance from the Red Army, the German infantry (and this is four-fifths of the invasion army) had to trudge to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line established in the "Barbarossa plan", waist-deep in snow ... " Completion of

concentration areas outlined by operational plans" in the first ten days of July means readiness to start a strategic OFFENSIVE operation **from July 15-20. This is the "lower limit" of the start date for the invasion** of Europe according to Stalin's "plan No. 3". The upper limit is also not difficult to determine based on assessment of the natural and climatic conditions of the Eastern European theater

of operations. The main blow, as noted above, was to be delivered in the direction of Lvov - Krakow, with the further development of the offensive on Katowice. The planned duration of the solution of the "first strategic task" was 25-30 days. But not everything in the war goes according to plan, besides, the successful solution of the "first task" was to be followed by the next one. On the other hand, in southern Poland, in Romania, Slovakia and Hungary there is also autumn and even winter - damp, slushy, with rains, For air and motorized troops operations, this is much worse than a "normal" Russian winter with severe frosts that turn all road directions into a "paved road" and fetter lakes and rivers with an ice "bridge". Thus, **the end of August - the beginning of September can be considered the deadline** after which it would be too risky to launch a large-scale offensive in southern Poland and the Balkans. It is worth comparing the chronology of the strategic deployment

of the Red Army with how the preparations for the invasion went on the other side of the future front. In December 1940, Hitler informed his generals: *"I will give the order for the strategic deployment of the armed forces against the Soviet Union, if necessary, for*

eight weeks before the scheduled start date of the operation. " Hitler fulfilled this promise ("eight weeks") - the day the operation began (June 22, 1941) was finally set and brought to the attention of the Wehrmacht high command on April 30, i.e. 52 days in advance counting the same eight weeks from the date of the Conference on May 24, we find ourselves on July 19 - a quite realistic date for the completion of all measures for the strategic deployment of the Red Army.

July-August 1941 and many of the captured commanders of the Red Army were named as the expected date for the start of the war. Of course, the circle of persons admitted to a military secret of such importance as the exact date of a surprise attack was extremely limited, therefore the testimony given below can only serve as a reflection of the general mood, the "common spirit" that soared in the Red Army in the summer of 1941.

Thus, military doctor Kotlyarevsky, who was called up on May 30, 1941 for a 45-day "training camp" to the medical battalion of the 147th Infantry Division, reported that "on June 7, the medical personnel were confidentially informed that after 45 days there would be no dismissal , *since in the near future there will be war with Germany.*"

Captain Krasko, adjutant commander of the 661st regiment of the 200th rifle division, testified: *"Back in May 1941, the opinion was expressed among the officers that the war would begin after July 1."*

According to Major Koskov, commander of the 25th regiment of the 44th rifle division, *"judging by the scale and intensity of the preparations for the war, the Russians would have attacked Germany in a maximum of 2-3 weeks" (after June 22 -*

M.S.). Colonel Gaevsky, commander of a regiment of the 29th Panzer Division (in the documents of the 29th TD there is no mention of a colonel with such a surname - M.S.) testified: "Among the commanders, they talked a lot about the war *between Germany and Russia. There was an opinion that the war would begin*

on about 15 July". Major Solovyov, chief of staff of the 445th regiment of the 140th rifle division: *"In principle, a conflict with Germany was expected after the harvest, around the end of August - the beginning of September. The hasty redeployment of troops to the western border can be explained by the fact that the time of the attack was moved back."*

Lieutenant Colonel Lyapin, head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 1st motorized rifle division, testified that *"a Soviet attack was expected in the*

autumn of 1941." Major General Malyshkin (before the war - senior lecturer, then head of the course at the Academy of the General Staff; chief of staff of the 19th Army of the Western Front, captured on October 11 in the Vyazemsky "cauldron"; one of Vlasov's main associates, hanged on August 1, 1946) stated that *"Russia would have attacked in mid-August, using about 350-360 divisions."*^[30] — .

The testimonies given in enemy captivity, and even by persons who actively collaborated with the invaders, raise understandable doubts. However, the ill-fated month of August, as the probable date for the start of the war, emerges in the most unexpected documents.

In January 1941, the General Staff held two strategic military games with the top command staff of the Red Army. Marshal Timoshenko personally supervised the preparation and conduct of the games, the results were reported to Stalin. It's strange, but the course of the games was tied not to abstract numbers ("the first day of the operation", "the fifth day of the operation" ...), but to some August (!!!) dates. In early June 1941, the

commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General M.M. Popov. June 15 M.M. Popov signed a report sent to the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR, in which he expressed concern about the insufficient, in his opinion, defense capability of the base in Khanko and made a number of specific proposals for its strengthening. The report ended with the following phrase: *"All these measures **must be carried out no later than August 1, 1941** (emphasized by me - M.S.) "* *The call to make **from July 1 to August 1, 1941.*** ^[32] On June 18, 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the ^[31].

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks makes the following decision: *"to issue to the People's Commissariat of Defense in June from state reserves 750 thousand pieces of automobile tires with a return at the UGMR [Department of State — .*

Mobilization Reserves] in September .

From June 18, the People's Commissariat for Rubber Industry will stop shipping tires to all consumers, with the exception of the people's commissariats and departments specified in Appendix 1, with the transfer of underloads to the 4th quarter."[33]

This document does not contain the word "August" - but there is a clear understanding that in June-July the People's Commissariat of Defense will have an emergency, "peak" need for tires. It was decided to cover this need with the use of emergency measures, and the "gap" formed in the reserves and supplies of civilian departments will be gradually filled, starting from September-October. It can be assumed with a high degree of certainty that the urgent need for tires was associated with the open mobilization planned for July-August, within the framework of which about 240 thousand cars were to be transferred from the national economy to the Red Army. The archives of the Comintern contain a most interesting collection of documents - reports on the work done (in most cases - subversive) of

the Finnish communists who crossed the front line in September 1941. Among others is the report by Comrade Reino V. Kosunen "On the Work of Party Organizations in Helsinki and Kuopio." The report ends with the following self-critical remark:

*"We, party members, were not at the level of international events at the time when a new war began. Two weeks before the start of the war between Germany - the Soviet Union and Finland (as in the text - M.S.) I received a report from the party leadership about the assessment of the situation, as I had to go on a party mission to Korkila. The report contained the following: 1. The war continues and spreads. This is not a lightning war. 2. The position of Finland is not expected to change until **autumn***

(underlined by me - M.S.), so the war is not yet expected. It means that we weren't preparing for war earlier than **in the fall.**"[34] The ability to self-criticizes

a person - but in this case, Comrade Kosunen is unfair to himself and unnamed "members of the party." This party was ruled not from Helsinki, but from Moscow. The Finnish comrades could not work out any other "assessments of the situation" except those that came from the Moscow leadership (and they had no right). And if the Finnish communists were preparing for a war that would begin "not earlier than autumn", then this idea was suggested Not

accidentally. It is no coincidence that the date of the alleged start of the war was named with some delay - the thoughtful misinformation of ordinary performers is an important and generally accepted method of hiding true information ... Strictly speaking, this is a brief overview of Stalin's three plans can be considered completed. Detailed detailing

and clarification of important details will become possible only with the expansion of the source base. On the other hand, the most important thing is already known for certain - none of these plans was ever implemented. In June 1941, in fact, the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces, which was just beginning, was an invasion. The troops that did not complete the mobilization interrupted by Hitler, scattered over vast areas, did not have time to build either

the planned offensive or improvised defensive groups, were subjected to a crushing blow from the Wehrmacht and were actually defeated in parts. And only the huge size of these "parts", 1941, 11,790 thousand people were colossal human resources (in the second half of drafted into the Red Army), the cyclopean mountains of weapons accumulated in the prewar years, the powerful defense industry, geographically inaccessible to German aviation, made it possible avoid complete defeat. There is, however, one more question, one more historical problem, which, without any exaggeration, deserves the name "mystery of June 1941." The problem is that in the last peaceful days (approximately from June 13 to June 22, 1941), the top military-political leadership of the USSR **performed actions (or no less inaction) that were surprising in the current situation.** Either we are dealing with a manifestation of insanity, an attack of temporary insanity of Comrade Stalin (which, by the way, is quite acceptable - history is full of examples of insane acts of the powerful of this world), or in those days a certain one, which has not yet been plainly deciphered by anyone, has

come into action, " Stalin's Plan No. 4. What exactly were these "inadequate actions and

absolutely

inadequate

inaction"? In the absence of reaction to the actions of the enemy.

For Hitler, the moment of transition from the stage of covert "sneaking" to the last decisive breakthrough came on **June 6 - 10, 1941**. These days, the loading of tank and motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht into the railway echelons going to the East began (until that moment, infantry accumulated near the western borders of the USSR, the gradually increasing concentration of which did not yet give grounds for unambiguous conclusions about the goals of the German command). On June 14-20, mechanized formations arrived at unloading stations 100-150 km from the border and moved in marching columns to the initial areas for the offensive.

The tank division of the Wehrmacht is an average of 200 tanks and more than 2.5 thousand wheeled and tracked vehicles, transporters, tractors and armored cars. The marching column of a tank division is a rumbling "steel band" raising dust to the sky, several tens of kilometers long. And not one division went to the Soviet borders. So, on a narrow (approximately 35 * 35 km) strip of the "Suwalki ledge" (at the junction of the borders of East Prussia, Lithuania and Belarus) in the second decade of June, four tank units (20th, 7th, 12th, 19th) and three motorized (14th, 20th, 18th) divisions of the Wehrmacht. And this is in addition to nine infantry (26, 6, 35, 5, 161, 28, 8, 256, 162).

On the same days, a large-scale relocation of Luftwaffe air groups to border airfields took place. So, the two largest fighter squadrons (air divisions) of the 2nd Air Fleet (JG 53 and JG 51) flew to the airfields of occupied Poland, respectively, on June 12-14 and 13-15, 1941. At the Suwalki airfield hub (and nearby field airfields) based four groups (regiments) of Junkers dives, five fighter air groups and two assault (ZG) groups equipped with twin-engine Me-110s. Soviet intelligence could not fail to notice such a concentration of enemy forces in a strip of 30-50 km from the border. It was even more difficult to make a mistake in assessing the task that the German command set for the troops, concentrating on narrow patches protruding into Soviet territory at the junction of military districts / fronts.

According to sound logic, according to the fundamental basics of military science and in accordance with many years of practical experience in a similar situation, the military-political leadership of the USSR should have

immediately take two interrelated decisions: 1. start a full-scale mobilization (i.e., call on the planned number of reservists, remove hundreds of thousands of vehicles and tens of thousands of tractors from the national economy and transfer them to the army, unbook mobilization stocks of military equipment) and 2. start a cover operation mobilization of concentration and deployment. It is these two decisions that constitute the concrete practical content of what is called in everyday language "to bring the troops into a state of full combat readiness." However, neither one nor the other was done. The Soviet Union, this extremely militarized totalitarian empire, which for many years was preparing for the Great War on a scale unthinkable for its neighbors, turned out to be the only one **among** the participants in the Second World War (meaning the large European states, and not the Latin American banana republics) that did not conduct a full-scale mobilization of the Armed Forces before the start of hostilities. Moreover, open mobilization in the USSR was not even started on the day the war began, but on the second day - June 23, 1941. This is an absolutely impossible, incredible situation. This was not the case anywhere: Germany and Poland, France and Finland, Romania, Italy and Belgium - all these countries began to mobilize a few days, or even a few weeks before the start of the war. The only exception to the rule was the Soviet Union.

The mobilization activities of the first day of mobilization were scheduled by the hour. Each hour of delay gave the enemy additional advantages. And yet, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR stated:

"On the basis of Article 49 of Clause "L" of the Constitution of the USSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet announces mobilization on the territory of the military districts - Leningrad, Special Baltic, Western Special, Kiev Special, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian.

Persons liable for military service born from 1905 to 1918 inclusive are subject to mobilization.

June 23, 1941 shall be considered the first day of mobilization.

This is the full text of the Decree. From start to finish. The announcement of mobilization from June 23 is such an incredible action that the authors of many historical books, without much discussion, call the date of the start of mobilization "natural and understandable to everyone" 22 June...

A noteworthy detail is that Marshal Zhukov, who clearly understands the absurdity of the situation of NOT declaring mobilization on the day the war began, begins to invent (and this is extremely politely expressed) in his memoirs the following story:

"... S. K. Timoshenko called J. V. Stalin and asked permission to come to the Kremlin to report on the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the mobilization and formation of the Headquarters of the High Command, as well as a number of other questions. J. V. Stalin answered, that he is busy at a meeting of the Politburo and can only receive it at 9 o'clock (it is strange that in the early morning of June 22 it could be more important for the notorious "Politburo" than the report of the leadership of the Armed Forces? - M.S.) ... A short way from the people's commissariat to The people's commissar's car and mine covered the Kremlin at extremely high speed. A. N. Poskrebyshv met us and immediately escorted us to the office of I. V. Stalin ... "[35]

How long could this trip "at extremely high speed" from one building in the center of Moscow to another take? If Zhukov's testimony were true, then Poskrebyshv would have opened the door to the Boss's office for Timoshenko and Zhukov at about 9:20. It doesn't take more than 20 minutes to drive from house to house, present documents to the guards and run up the stairs. Alas, the "Journal of Visits" silently but firmly convicts Zhukov of a lie: both he and Marshal Timoshenko entered Stalin's office at 14:00. At two o'clock in the afternoon. The cars "rushed" for five hours... In fact, the military meeting in Stalin's office began at 14:00, and at 16:00 Timoshenko, Zhukov, Kulik, Vatutin and Shaposhnikov left Stalin's office. The telegram announcing the mobilization was signed by the People's Commissar of Defense and handed over to the Central Telegraph of the Ministry of Communications at 16:40. June 22, 1941

"Mobilization is war." The complex of mobilization measures is so large that it will not be possible to hide from the enemy the mobilization that has begun (in the case of the announcement of the Decree of the Presidium

VS, there is no need to talk about the "secrecy" of mobilization). The announcement (or actual start) of mobilization can push the enemy to start hostilities. Such a threat is very real. It is for this reason that all the plans for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR, without exception, as well as the plans for the operational deployment of troops of the military districts, provided for the conduct of an operation to cover mobilization and concentration at the initial stage.

In the period from May 5 to May 14, 1941, the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent to the districts to develop full-fledged cover plans, and this work was completed in late May - early June 1941. Cover plans existed, they were detailed to the level of armies, corps and divisions and were stored at headquarters in the famous "red packets". The matter remained small - the cover plans had to be taken out of the safe and put

into action. And this is where the big problem arises. Unlike the sentry at the post (who not only has the right, but is also obliged to decide on the use of weapons on his own, without waiting for any guidance from above), not a single commander had the right to start a cover operation without a direct order from a superior commander. At the "top of the pyramid", at the command level of military districts / fronts, the cover plans ended with the following phrase: *"The cover plan is put into effect upon receipt of an encrypted telegram signed by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, a member of the Main Military Council and the Chief of the General Staff with the following content: "Proceed to implement cover plan of 1941. " But these four words **were***

never uttered. Instead of a short, prearranged phrase ("put the cover plan into effect") late in the evening of June 21, 1941, Timoshenko and Zhukov (and, in fact, Stalin) sent in the district a whole essay that went down in history under the name "Directive No. 1. Here is its full text:

"1. During June 22 - 23, 1941, a sudden attack by the Germans on the fronts of the LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, OdVO is possible. The attack may begin with provocative actions.

2. The task of our troops is not to succumb to any provocative actions that could cause major complications.

At the same time, the troops of the Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kyiv and Odessa military districts should be in full combat readiness, to meet a possible surprise attack by the Germans or their allies.

I ORDER: a)

during the night of June 22, 1941, covertly occupy fire points of fortified areas on the state border;

b) before dawn on June 22, 1941, disperse all aviation, including military aviation, over field airfields, carefully disguise it; c) put all units on combat

readiness. Troops to keep dispersed and camouflaged;

d) put the air defense on alert without additional lifting of the assigned staff. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects; e) do not carry out any other activities without special

instructions. The discussion and analysis of the meaning of this text has been

going on for more than half a century. Some argue that the main thing in the Directive is the requirement "not to succumb to provocations." Still others rightly point to the obvious ambiguity of the Directive: how can one "meet the blow of the Germans" without carrying out "any other measures" except dispersal and camouflage? How, in the conditions of the most severe shortage of time, should the commanders of the districts distinguish between "provocative actions" and "sudden German strikes"?

Until the very last minutes of peacetime, Moscow did not give a direct and clear order to put the cover plan into action. In the testimony of the commander of the Western Front D.G. Pavlova (minutes of the first interrogation dated July 7, 1941), the events of the night of June 22 are described as follows:

"... At one in the morning on June 22 of this year, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, I was summoned to the headquarters of the front. Together with me, a member of the Military Council, Corps Commissar Fominykh and the head

front headquarters Major General Klimovskikh. The people's commissar asked the first question on the phone: "Well, how are you, calmly?" I replied that a very large movement of German troops was observed on the right flank: according to the report of the commander of the 3rd Army, Kuznetsov, German motorized mechanized columns were continuously moving into the Suvalsky ledge for a day and a half. According to his own report, in the Augustow-Sapotskin section, the Germans removed the

barrage wire in many places. The people's commissar replied to my report: "Be calm and don't panic, gather the headquarters just in case this morning, maybe something unpleasant will happen, but look, don't go for any provocation. If there are separate provocations, call". This ended the conversation...

So, in addition to hundreds of other reports that came to the General Staff of the Red Army, the commander of the troops of the border district reports that the enemy has removed the wire barriers, and columns of tanks and motorized infantry are constantly moving towards the border. There is a connection between Minsk and Moscow, and it works steadily. Commissar's order - do not panic. At the same time, Tymoshenko suggests that on the morning of June 22 "something unpleasant may happen." Did the marshal and people's commissar of defense really use these words to describe a possible attack by the 3 millionth German army? "...

At 3 hours 30 minutes, the people's commissar of defense called me on the phone again and asked - what's new? I answered him that now there is nothing new, I have established contact with the armies and given appropriate instructions to the commanders ..." Once again, we note that the connection is working steadily, the commanders in Moscow, Minsk, Grodno, Bialystok and Kobrin do not sleep, on the other side of the border the order to attack was brought to the attention of three million soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht more than 12 hours ago (which should have been recorded by Soviet military intelligence). But the people's commissar of defense stubbornly refuses to utter the four cherished words: "Introduce the cover plan." However, at 3 o'clock in the morning

on June 22, such an order could have changed little... There are two descriptions of Comrade Stalin's reaction to the news of the German invasion.

man - Marshal Zhukov. For many years, the following text was textbook-familiar:

"... About three minutes later I.V. Stalin approached the apparatus. I reported the situation and asked permission to start retaliatory

hostilities. I.V. Stalin is silent. I only hear his heavy breathing. - Do you understand me?

Silence again. - Will there be instructions

I insist. Finally, as if waking up, JV Stalin asked: "Where is the people's

commissar?" 30 minutes in the morning,

S. K. Timoshenko and I arrived at the Kremlin. All the summoned members of the Politburo were already

assembled. The People's Commissar and I were invited into the office. I. V. Stalin was pale and sat at the table, holding a pipe not stuffed with tobacco in his hands. We reported the situation, JV Stalin said in bewilderment:

Isn't this a provocation of the German generals?

"The Germans are bombing our cities in the Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltics. What kind of provocation is this... - S. K. Timoshenko replied.

"If it is necessary to organize a provocation," said I. V. Stalin, "then the German generals will bomb their cities too ..." And, after thinking for a while, he continued: "Hitler certainly does not know about this.

"We urgently need to call the German embassy," he turned to V. M. Molotov. The

embassy replied that Ambassador Count von Schulenburg asked to receive him for an urgent message. V. M. Molotov was instructed to receive the

ambassador ... " As soon as some archival funds revealed their secrets in the early 90s, numerous "mistakes" in this passage from Zhukov's Memoirs and Reflections became apparent. The meeting in Stalin's office began not 4:30 a.m., but 5:45 a.m. By this time, Ambassador Schulenburg had already handed over to Molotov the official statement of the German government with a declaration of war, and accordingly, there was no reason to "urgently call the German embassy."

In Stalin's office (not counting the military), not the entire Politburo gathered, but exactly two of its members: Molotov and Beria. True, there was one more person there whom Zhukov did not mention, and who, judging by his formal status, was not supposed to be present at a meeting of such a level and with such an agenda: Comrade Mekhlis, People's Commissar of State Control. Moreover - what is even more surprising - over the past 12 hours, Mekhlis ended up in Stalin's office twice - on the evening of June 21, he was present (participated?) in the discussion of "Directive No. 1" and left the office along with all the military (Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Budyonny) in 22-20. There is also

a second version. Many years before writing his memoirs, on May 19, 1956, G.K. Zhukov compiled and submitted for approval to N.S. Khrushchev a draft of his report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The plenum, which was supposed to give a harsh assessment of the "cult of personality", never took place, and the text of Zhukov's unspoken speech lay in archival confinement for almost half a century. The description of the events of the morning of June 22, 1941 largely coincides with the memoir, but there are several important differences:

*"... Comrade S. K. Timoshenko and I asked permission to give the troops an order for appropriate response actions. Stalin, breathing heavily into the telephone receiver, could not say anything for several minutes, and answered repeated questions: "This is a provocation by the German military . **Do not open fire, so as not to unleash wider actions** (emphasized by me - M.S.). Tell Poskrebyshev to call Beria, Molotov, Malenkov to the meeting by 5 o'clock for you and Timoshenko to arrive." Stalin reiterated his idea of a provocation by the Germans when he arrived at the Central*

Committee. The message that German troops had already broken into a number of sectors on our territory, did not convince him that the enemy started a real and pre-prepared war. Until 6 hours 30 minutes he did not give permission for retaliatory actions and for opening fire ... "[36] This version is much more accurate - and chronologically , and according to the named participants in the — .

meeting (G. Malenkov, a member of the Main Military Council, was in Stalin's office on the morning of June 22, however, he appeared there only at 7-30). It should also be noted the important circumstance that Comrade Zhukov had to deliver his report at the Plenum **in the presence of**

a living witness to the events - in the spring of 1956, Molotov was still a member of the Central Committee. This is an additional reason to believe in the greater plausibility of this version, according to which Stalin not only regarded what happened as a *"provocation of the German military"*, but also

directly prohibited retaliatory actions! The point in time at which the troops were allowed to return fire to fire is also almost exactly indicated. Directive #2 was sent to the western districts at 7-15. It was composed in the following terms:

"On June 22, 1941, at 04:00 in the morning, German aviation, without any reason, raided our airfields and cities along the western border and bombarded them. At the same time, German troops opened artillery fire in different places and crossed our border."

In connection with the unheard-of impudence attack from Germany against the Soviet Union I ORDER:

1. Troops to attack enemy forces with all their strength and means and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet border.

2.

Reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping of its ground forces.

Destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb groupings of his ground forces with powerful strikes by bomber and attack aircraft. Air strikes should be carried out to the depth of German territory up to 100-150 km. Bomb Königsberg and Memel. Do not make any raids on the territory

of Finland and Romania until special instructions. " Neither in form nor in content,

Directive No. 2 absolutely does not correspond to the statutory norms for drawing up combat orders. There is a standard, and it must be followed. This standard was not set by someone's literary tastes , and article 90 of the Field Manual PU-39 (*"The first paragraph of the order gives a concise description of the actions and the general grouping of the enemy The second paragraph indicates the tasks of the neighbors and the borders with them. The third paragraph gives the formulation of the task of the formation and the decision of the commander,*

giving the order ... In the following paragraphs, particular tasks (immediate and subsequent) are set for subordinate formations ... ")

From the position of these statutory requirements, Directive No. 2 is nothing more than an emotional (if not hysterical) cry. To collapse and destroy is not a military order. Where is the enemy? What are his powers? With what forces, in what grouping, is it necessary to "collapse"? In what directions? At what frontiers? Why did the main task of the Air Force become "to bomb Koenigsberg and Memel (Klaipeda)? And since when did the combat order discuss the "unheard-of impudence of the enemy"? The emotional excitement of Directive No. 2, completely out of

place in the secret combat order, looks especially strange against the background of cold style and style of the Decree of the Presidium of the Armed Forces with the announcement of mobilization. In the text of the fateful Decree (and it actually determined the fate of millions of people) there is not even the slightest mention of the invasion of German troops that has already taken place, the treacherous attack of the enemy, the sacred duty of the defenders of the Motherland ... Strange and the mysterious events of the last pre-war days could not help but

attract the attention of historians and journalists. Hundreds of articles and books have already been written on this topic. The first in chronological order was put forward by a stunning version in its absurdity that Comrade Stalin was not gullible, but super gullible. Naive and stupid. A student of the institute of noble maidens, blushing at the sight of naked horses in the street, could be considered a "genius of villainy" in comparison with this simple-minded fool. It turns out that Stalin lovingly looked at Ribbentrop's signature on the Non-Aggression Pact instead of bringing the troops to a "state of full readiness" ...

Then this one ~~was modified~~ ^{was improved}. No, our tyrant did not believe Ribbentrop, he was simply confused and fell into prostration. For greater importance, an Israeli professor G. Gorodetsky was called (he, by the way, is not a repatriate from the former USSR, but a born Israeli), who in a book with a delightful title: "Fatal self-deception. Stalin and the German attack", without a shadow of irony, wrote this :

"... Stalin simply refused to accept intelligence messages ... Stalin was clearly at a loss, but desperately did not want to part with his delusion ... Stalin, apparently, drove away any thought of the war, he lost the initiative and was practically paralyzed ..." Not many inferior to the "foreign consultant"

and local personnel. One comrade wrote the following verbatim: *"Expecting an imminent defeat in the event of a war, and for himself personally, death, Stalin probably considered resistance useless, which is why he did not try to threaten Hitler or prepare for battle on time ... In the first days of the war, he released from the hands of the leadership, completely not taking part in any affairs ... "* This version, amazing in its power of

fatal self-deception "(although in this case, most likely, we should not talk about the self-deception of the authors, but about the purposeful deception of others) version could not survive first meeting with the array of documents and facts that was discovered in the first half of the 90s. Today, there is no

longer the slightest doubt about the fact that in the spring of 1941, Stalin was not at all paralyzed, confused and frightened to the point of insanity. Not only did he not "drive away any thought of war," but he prepared for it with the utmost effort. Starting from the second decade of June, in an atmosphere of the deepest secrecy, measures began to be carried out that cannot be interpreted otherwise than as preparations for war. To a war that should begin not in some "foreseeable future", but **in the very next few days and hours.**

The most significant fact is the creation of front-line departments and their withdrawal to field command posts. In peacetime, fronts as part of the Red Army were never created (the Far Eastern Front deployed since the late 1930s can serve as just an example of an "exception that confirms the rule" - the border with Japan-occupied China continuously flared up either large or small armed conflicts). And, on the contrary, front-line administrations were created before each "liberation campaign" (September 11, 1939 - six days before the invasion of Poland, January 7, 1940 - after the "triumphant march to Helsinki" turned into a real war, 9 June 1940 - nineteen days

before the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina). The formation of active fronts on the basis of the troops of the districts, the withdrawal of the headquarters of the fronts from the district centers (Riga, Minsk, Kiev, Odessa) to field command posts, which began on June 19, 1941, direct preparation for a close and inevitable war. - This

No less indicative are other decisions and actions of the Soviet command, unequivocally testifying to intense preparations for hostilities, which should begin in the very next few days. For example, here are the orders and orders issued by the command of the Baltic Special Military District: Order No. 0052 of June 15, 1941.

*"... The installation of anti-tank mines and wire obstacles in front of the front edge of the fortified strip should be prepared in such a way that a minefield will be established within three hours ... Begin to install wire obstacles immediately ... From the first hour of hostilities (hereinafter, it is emphasized by me - **M.S.**) organize the protection of their rear, and immediately detain all persons who inspire suspicion and quickly establish their identity ... **Disperse and camouflage aircraft at airfields in forests, bushes,** preventing formation in a line, but maintaining full readiness for departure. and artillery should be dispersed, **placed in the forests, carefully camouflaged,** while maintaining the opportunity to assemble on alarm in a timely manner ... The army commander, corps and division commanders should draw up a calendar plan for the execution of the order, which will **be fully completed by June 25 of this year.** "[37]*

Order No. 00229 of June 18, 1941

*"... To the head of the air defense zone, **by the end of June 19, 1941,** put the entire air defense of the district on full combat readiness ... **By July 1, 1941,** complete the construction of command posts, starting from the battery commander to the commander of the brigade area (air defense) ... **No later than the morning of 20.6 .41** at the front and army command posts to throw out teams with the necessary property to organize communication centers on them ... Outline and make teams of signalmen that should be*

ready **by the morning of June 20, 1941**, by order of the commanders of the formations, to take control of the

communication centers approved by me ... To determine the points for organizing field warehouses of anti-tank mines, explosives and army. To concentrate the ~~obstacles in the possession of~~ property in organized warehouses **by 21.6.41** ... To create mobile detachments

of mine anti-tank combat in the Telsiai, Siauliai, Kaunas and Kalvary directions. For this purpose, to have stocks of anti-tank mines transported by road. The readiness of the detachments **on 21.6.41**

The plan for the destruction of bridges is to be approved by the military councils of the armies. Deadline **21.6.41** ... Select from the parts of the district (except mechanized and aviation) all gas tanks and transfer them 50% each to the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps. Completion date **21.6.41** . "[38]

On the same day, June 18, the commander of the 12th mechanized corps mentioned above, Major General Shestopalova, issued order No. 0033. The order was topped with the highest secrecy stamp ("of special importance, top secret"), which is very rare for corps-level documents. Order No. 0033 begins with the following words: *"Upon receipt of this order , **put all units on alert. Put units on alert in accordance with the plans for raising the alert, but do not announce the alarm itself ... Take** with you only what is necessary for life and battle."* Then comes the instruction to begin at 23-00 on June 18 the advance to the areas of concentration, and all the final points of the routes are in dense forests. [39] Strictly speaking, there is nothing surprising in these and other similar documents. Of course, in the last

peaceful days of June 41, Stalin did not drive "thoughts about war", but at the maximum pace completed the last preparations for the start of the war. The only surprising thing is that this has to be proved as a kind of "sensational discovery". Something else is incredible and almost inexplicable: literally 1-2 days before the actual start of the war, events began to occur in the troops of the western border districts that are difficult

can be described otherwise as **a deliberate reduction in combat readiness!**

Facts of this kind are scattered mainly in memoirs and therefore can cause a certain distrust. Nevertheless, one can no longer ignore the numerous testimonies of the participants in the events. There are numerous reports of cases of cancellation of previously issued

orders to increase combat readiness, an unexpected announcement of days off, and the recall of anti-aircraft artillery of border units to rear firing ranges. Noteworthy is the "big theatrical evening" held on June 21, 1941. It is known that the command of the Western OVO spent the evening of June 21 in the Minsk House of Officers, on the stage of which the comedy "Wedding in Malinovka" was staged. Everyone who wrote about this was loudly indignant at the "short-sighted carelessness" of the district commander. However, even the most cursory examination of the memorial literature makes it possible to be convinced that on the evening of June 21, not only General of the Army Pavlov went on a "cult trip". *"... On Saturday, June 21, 1941, a brigade of artists headed by the famous Belarusian composer Lyuban arrived*

at our air garrison from Minsk. Not so often we were pampered with their attention by theatrical artists, so the House of the Red Army was overcrowded .. ." *"... On Saturday, June 21, forty-first, in the garrison House of the Red Army, as usual, an evening took place. The Red Army Song and Dance*

Ensemble arrived from the district. After the concert, according to the hospitable army tradition, I and the corps commander, Lieutenant General Dmitry Ivanovich Ryabyshev invited members of the ensemble to dinner. I returned home only at three o'clock in the morning ... "" ... 21

June deputy commander of the 98th long-range bomber regiment for political affairs, battalion commissar Vasily Egorovich Molodtsov invited me to the Shatalovo airfield, where an evening of amateur performances was to be held at the local House of the Red Army ... "

"... On the evening of June 21, the whole family was in the theater. Together with us in the box was the head of the political department of the army, also with

family..."

"....I have one nice suggestion: at eight o'clock on the open stage of the House of the Red Army there will be a performance by artists of the Belarusian Operetta Theater - let's see... - With pleasure," I agreed. "I hope that the performance of the Minsk operetta will be no worse than the concert of Moscow pop artists in Brest, to which Shlykov and Rozhkov went ... "

Army General S.P. Ivanov (in the first days of the war - the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the 13th Army of the Western Front) in his memoirs gives a very interesting explanation for such actions of the Soviet command:

"...Stalin sought by the very state and behavior of the troops of the border districts **to make it clear to Hitler that calm reigns in our country, if not carelessness** (a strange, however, desire for someone who is preparing for defense - M.S.). And this was done , as they say, in its most natural form. For example, anti-aircraft units were at the training camp ... As a result, instead of misleading the aggressor about the combat readiness of our troops by skillful disinformation actions, we actually reduced it to an extremely low level ... "

The mysterious events of the last pre-war days can, in my opinion, be explained, linked into a certain logical chain within the next version. I'll make a reservation right away - I don't have direct documentary evidence of this version (and it's hard to believe that they will ever be found). Nevertheless, this hypothesis deserves discussion, if only because it allows a rational explanation of many of the above-mentioned seemingly contradictory and incredible facts. So, suppose that the word "provocation", which is repeated in every way both in

Zhukov's memoirs and in Stalin's orders, **did not appear at all by chance**. It was no coincidence that People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko warned the commander of the Western Front, D. Pavlov, that *"something unpleasant may happen this morning, but look, don't go for any provocation."* Stalin, Timoshenko, Zhukov **absolutely knew for sure that on Sunday, June 22, 1941, "the attack could begin with provocative actions."** They knew because they themselves prepared this attack and this provocation.

Hitler's secret plans were never on Stalin's desk, but the actual redeployment of German troops was tracked by Soviet intelligence, aviation and radio intelligence in sufficient detail. Based on this information, quite realistic estimates of the probable plans of the enemy were built. In June 1941, Soviet intelligence recorded the beginning of the operational deployment of Wehrmacht strike groups near the borders of the USSR. The correct conclusions were drawn from this fact - Hitler is preparing an invasion that will take place in the summer of 1941, in the very next weeks or even days. A fatal mistake was made only in determining the time it would take the German command to complete the concentration of troops, and, accordingly, in setting the date for the possible start of the invasion. Stalin did not change the general strategic plan of the initial

operations of the war. He prepared his "blitzkrieg" for so long, so persistently, so carefully that he really did not want to break the plan of the war, which was to begin with a devastating surprise blow to the enemy. Stalin, indeed, "driven away every thought" - but not the thought of the war (he no longer thought of anything else), but that Hitler at the very last moment would be able to get ahead of him. Therefore, after long and, one might assume, painful reflections, after repeated meetings with the military leadership (in June 41, Zhukov and Timoshenko were in Stalin's office seven times -: 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 18, 21 - moreover on other days, the military came to Stalin twice and the discussion dragged on for four hours), it was decided once again to change the start date of the operation in the direction of approach. It was probably supposed to start the offensive of the Red Army in the last days of June 1941. Within the framework of this plan (let's call it "plan No. 4"), Monday, June 23, 1941, was set as the day for the start of open general mobilization. The decision to start open general mobilization on

Monday was quite logical. In the Soviet Union, the workplace was the center of life. Factory. It was there that the "draft contingents" were concentrated, it was there on the morning of June 23, 1941 that "spontaneous rallies" of workers were to take place, at which a pre-prepared Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces on the announcement of mobilization would be announced. Precisely because the text of the Decree was prepared

in advance, there was not the slightest mention of the Nazi invasion and the actual outbreak of war. But

Comrade Stalin was wise, and he understood that the Decree of the Presidium alone would not be enough. Especially after for two years Stalinist propaganda explained to the workers that only enemies can call for a *"war to destroy Hitlerism, covered by a false flag of struggle for democracy"* (V. Molotov's speech at the Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939 people, vile hirelings of the Anglo-American warmongers. Of course, Stalin did not doubt for a second the humility of the people he had brought up, but humility alone was not enough for such a thing that he planned. What was needed was "noble fury", burning hearts. Simply put, it was necessary to organize and carry out a large-scale bloody provocation.

The staging of a German air strike on a Soviet city (cities) was chosen as the specific content of such a provocation. Sunday, June 22, 1941, preceding the day the mobilization began, was the best suited for the implementation of the plan. To obtain the maximum possible number of victims among the civilian population, the bombing on Sunday afternoon was the best option: a warm sunny day off, people slept off after a hard week of work and took to the streets, gardens and squares, take a walk with children ... The technical possibilities for staging were: more in the 40th year, two Dornier-215 bombers, two Junkers-88 and five multi-purpose Me-110 bombers were purchased in Germany, not to mention the fact that at an altitude of 5-6 km no one except highly qualified specialists, and would not recognize the silhouettes of aircraft.

Comrade Stalin had firm ideas about the exact forms in which the "invariably peace-loving foreign policy" of the Soviet Union should manifest itself. With the inexorable persistence of the "terminator" he carried out these ideas. Everything had to be "correct". The Soviet Union could not attack Finland. The Red Army was supposed to stop the provocations of the White Finnish military, which treacherously fired on Soviet territory in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Mainila. In June 41, a war of an immeasurably larger scale was to be launched, respectively, and

another "pre-war provocation" should have been much more noticeable and bloody. It is extremely

important to note that the first part, the first step of the Great Dramatization **took place in reality. This is not a hypothesis. It is a fact.** On June 13, 1941, the famous TASS Report was compiled and published on June 14. Yes, yes, the same:

"... TASS declares that, according to the USSR, Germany is also steadily complying with the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, like the Soviet Union, which is why, according to Soviet circles, rumors about Germany's intention to break the pact and launch an attack on the USSR are deprived any soil ... The USSR, as follows from its peace policy, observed and intends to comply with the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, which is why the rumors that the USSR is preparing for war with Germany are false and provocative ... "Behind this, the first stage the second was bound

to follow: a mock bombing of Soviet cities by German aircraft. In response to the most peaceful statement of TASS - bombs on a sunny Sunday. Treacherous and vile murder of peaceful Soviet citizens. The corpses of murdered women and children in the fresh greenery of parks and squares. A snow-white dove of peace - on the one hand, black crows - on the other. And only after all this - general mobilization. "Get up, huge country, get up for a mortal battle!"

Rough? Too deliberate? Yes, but it was precisely this "style and cut" that Comrade Stalin loved. Rough, absurd, slovenly "stitched" provocations. In the course of the open "Moscow trials" of 1936, the defendants confessed to secret meetings with long-dead people, which "meetings" supposedly took place in long-demolished hotels. The secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, "Mr. Kuusinen", who has been living in Moscow since 1918, was declared the head of the "people's government of democratic Finland". *"Jewelry precision of a hippopotamus"* (A.I. Solzhenitsyn). And nothing. During spontaneous meetings, the working people warmly approved and fully supported ...

The hypothesis of a provocative staging scheduled for June 22 not only corresponds to the general style of Stalinist

"liberations", but also allows you to immediately explain several of the most "inexplicable" facts on the eve of the war.

First of all, those actions to demonstrate complacency and carelessness that took place on June 20-21 become clear. For a greater propaganda effect, the provocations of the bombs were to fall on the Soviet city in a peaceful, outwardly completely calm environment. In combat units - a day off. The command enjoys high theatrical art, the rank and file run Komsomol crosses and compete in volleyball skills. We are peaceful people, and our armored train is rusting on the siding ... In addition to the propaganda effect, the lowering of combat readiness and the endless spells "do not succumb to provocations" also had a very practical meaning: the provocative bombardment had to take place successfully, and not a single return shot on the adjacent territory should be was to sound. The unexpected appearance of Mekhlis in Stalin's office on the evening of June 21 and early morning of June 22 becomes understandable - starting from 1924, this man was next to Stalin, acting as a particularly

trusted guarantor for secret and dirty affairs. Finally, Stalin's reaction to the announcement of the beginning of the war becomes psychologically understandable (or, to be quite precise, to the announcement of the German bombing strikes that began at dawn on June 22). Stalin was

shocked, stunned and almost speechless - how could it be otherwise? It was impossible to believe in such an incredible coincidence. It's like hitting an opponent's bullet during a duel! This could not be, because it could never be ... Mark Twain once said: *"Truth is more amazing than fiction, because fiction must be kept within the limits of the probable, but the truth is not."* The above version of the events of June 1941 is improbable enough to eventually turn out to be true.

notes

1

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2

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8 RGA of the Navy, f. R-1877, op. 1, d. 195, l.1

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9 RGA of the Navy, f. R-1877, op. 1, d. 150, l. 2

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10. RGVA, f. 29, op. 56, d. 89, l. 1-19

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11. RGVA, f. 29, op. 56, d. 92, l. 1-34

12

12. RGVA, f.9, op. 29, d. 547, l. 378

13

13. TsAMO, f.16, op. 2951, d..239, l. 1-37

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14. TsAMO, f.16, op. 2951, d..239, l. 197-244

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15. TsAMO, f.16, op. 2951, d..242, l. 84-90

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16. TsAMO, f.16, op. 2951, d..239, l. 245-277

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27. GARF. R-8418, op. 25, d. 683, l. 253

28. GARF. R-8418, op. 25, d. 481, l. 32-33

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33. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 36, l. eleven

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38. *ibid.*, pp. 22-25

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